Skip to main content

Main menu

  • Home
  • Current Issue
  • Past Issues
  • Videos
  • Submit an article
  • More
    • About JWM
    • Editorial Board
    • Published Ahead of Print (PAP)
  • IPR Logo
  • About Us
  • Journals
  • Publish
  • Advertise
  • Videos
  • Webinars
  • More
    • Awards
    • Article Licensing
    • Academic Use
  • LinkedIn
  • Twitter

User menu

  • Sample our Content
  • Request a Demo
  • Log in

Search

  • ADVANCED SEARCH: Discover more content by journal, author or time frame
The Journal of Wealth Management
  • IPR Logo
  • About Us
  • Journals
  • Publish
  • Advertise
  • Videos
  • Webinars
  • More
    • Awards
    • Article Licensing
    • Academic Use
  • Sample our Content
  • Request a Demo
  • Log in
The Journal of Wealth Management

The Journal of Wealth Management

ADVANCED SEARCH: Discover more content by journal, author or time frame

  • Home
  • Current Issue
  • Past Issues
  • Videos
  • Submit an article
  • More
    • About JWM
    • Editorial Board
    • Published Ahead of Print (PAP)
  • LinkedIn
  • Twitter
Article

Venture Capital Financing and Corporate Governance: Role of Entrepreneurs in Minimizing Information / Incentive Asymmetry and Maximization of Wealth

K.B Subhash
The Journal of Wealth Management Fall 2009, 12 (2) 113-129; DOI: https://doi.org/10.3905/jwm.2009.12.2.113
K.B Subhash
is a reader in the department of commerce at Goa University in Goa, India.
  • Find this author on Google Scholar
  • Find this author on PubMed
  • Search for this author on this site
  • For correspondence: subhash@unigoa.ac.in
  • Article
  • Info & Metrics
  • PDF (Subscribers Only)
Loading

Click to login and read the full article.

Don’t have access? Click here to request a demo 
Alternatively, Call a member of the team to discuss membership options
US and Overseas: +1 646-931-9045
UK: 0207 139 1600

Abstract

Although various corporate governance models have developed over the last 75 years the problems of information/ incentive asymmetry still exist and lead to corporate fraud, the abuse of managerial power, absence of transparency, and social responsibility issues. These problems remain unsolved around the world irrespective of the size of the country, type of economy, or the nature of business operations. This article suggests an alternative model, based on the multiplier effects of venture capital (VC) financing, to see whether information/incentive asymmetry ceases to exist and complete transparency emerges from resorting to venture capital financing (i.e., by both categories of entrepreneurs-venture capitalists as well as the assisted business units). An overview of venture capital financing over the last 60 years throws some light on an otherwise unexplored area in corporate governance. Various models proposed for efficient corporate governance support the initial argument and lead to the integration of venture capital financing in identifying the role of venture capital in corporate governance. To support and supplement the argument for the new model, future research areas have been identified.

  • © 2009 Pageant Media Ltd
View Full Text

Don’t have access? Click here to request a demo

Alternatively, Call a member of the team to discuss membership options

US and Overseas: +1 646-931-9045

UK: 0207 139 1600

Log in using your username and password

Forgot your user name or password?
PreviousNext
Back to top

Explore our content to discover more relevant research

  • By topic
  • Across journals
  • From the experts
  • Monthly highlights
  • Special collections

In this issue

The Journal of Wealth Management: 12 (2)
The Journal of Wealth Management
Vol. 12, Issue 2
Fall 2009
  • Table of Contents
  • Index by author
Print
Download PDF
Article Alerts
Sign In to Email Alerts with your Email Address
Email Article

Thank you for your interest in spreading the word on The Journal of Wealth Management.

NOTE: We only request your email address so that the person you are recommending the page to knows that you wanted them to see it, and that it is not junk mail. We do not capture any email address.

Enter multiple addresses on separate lines or separate them with commas.
Venture Capital Financing and Corporate Governance: Role of Entrepreneurs in Minimizing Information / Incentive Asymmetry and Maximization of Wealth
(Your Name) has sent you a message from The Journal of Wealth Management
(Your Name) thought you would like to see the The Journal of Wealth Management web site.
CAPTCHA
This question is for testing whether or not you are a human visitor and to prevent automated spam submissions.
Citation Tools
Venture Capital Financing and Corporate Governance: Role of Entrepreneurs in Minimizing Information / Incentive Asymmetry and Maximization of Wealth
K.B Subhash
The Journal of Wealth Management Jul 2009, 12 (2) 113-129; DOI: 10.3905/jwm.2009.12.2.113

Citation Manager Formats

  • BibTeX
  • Bookends
  • EasyBib
  • EndNote (tagged)
  • EndNote 8 (xml)
  • Medlars
  • Mendeley
  • Papers
  • RefWorks Tagged
  • Ref Manager
  • RIS
  • Zotero
Save To My Folders
Share
Venture Capital Financing and Corporate Governance: Role of Entrepreneurs in Minimizing Information / Incentive Asymmetry and Maximization of Wealth
K.B Subhash
The Journal of Wealth Management Jul 2009, 12 (2) 113-129; DOI: 10.3905/jwm.2009.12.2.113
del.icio.us logo Digg logo Reddit logo Twitter logo CiteULike logo Facebook logo Google logo LinkedIn logo Mendeley logo
Tweet Widget Facebook Like LinkedIn logo

Jump to section

  • Article
    • Abstract
    • BACKGROUND
    • VENTURE CAPITAL: AN OVERVIEW
    • CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN OVERVIEW
    • VENTURE CAPITAL AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
    • SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
    • CONCLUSION
    • ENDNOTES
    • REFERENCES
  • Info & Metrics
  • PDF (Subscribers Only)
  • PDF (Subscribers Only)

Similar Articles

Cited By...

  • No citing articles found.
  • Google Scholar

More in this TOC Section

  • Two Book Reviews
  • Editor’s Letter
  • Well-Being Advisers
Show more Article
LONDON
One London Wall, London, EC2Y 5EA
United Kingdom
+44 207 139 1600
 
NEW YORK
41 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10010
USA
+1 646 931 9045
pm-research@pageantmedia.com
 

Stay Connected

  • LinkedIn
  • Twitter

MORE FROM PMR

  • Home
  • Awards
  • Investment Guides
  • Videos
  • About PMR

INFORMATION FOR

  • Academics
  • Agents
  • Authors
  • Content Usage Terms

GET INVOLVED

  • Advertise
  • Publish
  • Article Licensing
  • Contact Us
  • Subscribe Now
  • Log In
  • Update your profile
  • Give us your feedback

© 2021 Pageant Media Ltd | All Rights Reserved | ISSN: 1534-7524 | E-ISSN: 2374-1368

  • Site Map
  • Terms & Conditions
  • Cookies
  • Privacy Policy